The possible routes by which Pasteurella pneumotropica could have gained access to the animals in a strictly barrier-maintained unit, where it established an infection of the upper respiratory tract, are discussed. Details of management before and after the breakdown and the methods of restocking the same building as rapidly as possible with uninfected animals are described.
animals by hysterectomy from stock which is free of those listed organisms that are capable of passing the placental barrier; the maintenance of animals behind a barrier so that the probability of contamination by a listed organism is minimal.
In a carefully established and maintained hysterectomy-derived colony, the chance of introducing a pathogen should be remote, but nevertheless the possibility that a contamination or a breakdown will occur is there. Considering the large number of SPF buildings now in existence, it is surprising how few records of such breakdowns are available. A contamination might not be considered a breakdown if the organism was of comparatively low pathogenicity, and the original list of specified pathogens amended so that the contaminant was no longer listed. The introduction of a grading scheme (Townsend, 1969) , based on strictly defined lists of pathogens, makes any such breakdown more obvious.
This contribution describes a breakdown in the SPF colony maintained by the MRC Laboratory Animals Centre at Carshalton, and discusses the factors which may have been responsible. It is hoped that the publication of this information may be of assistance to others concerned with this field of laboratory animal husbandry.
HISTORY, DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT OF THE COLONY

General construction of the building
The SPF building (Dinsley, 1963 ) is brick built, providing some 222m 2 (2 400ft 2) of animal accommodation. It is ventilated by air under positive pressure which passes through coarse filters capable of retaining particles larger than 5 !lm. Air changes per hour vary in different parts of the building between 8 and 11 at different times of the year. Except for the entry shower unit for staff and other sterilising entry locks for material, the building is completely sealed (Fig. 1) . The 12 animal rooms, the main service area, and the staff shower units open on to a central service corridor, so that a common microbiological community is likely.
Introduction of animals
The building was first established in 1963 with the introduction of germfree mice and rats artificially contaminated with a lactobacillus, Escherichia coli, and an enterococcus. New strains of mice and rats were derived by hysterectomy, introduced into the building, and cross-fostered onto members of the original colonies. Over 400 hysterectomies were carried out up to April 1969, when contamination of animals within the building was detected. During this period, 24 strains of mice, 5 strains of rats, 3 strains of guinea-pigs, 2 breeds of rabbits and a colony of cats were established. In addition, hysterectomies were carried out for other institutes, and the young cross-fostered to stock in the SPF building so that they could later be returned to the institute concerned in a disease-free state. This service was discontinued in 1968 because of the risk of introducing disease.
The guinea-pig colony was established in April 1965 by hysterectomy and hand-rearing techniques (Owen & Porter, 1967) . In November 1965 a rabbit colony was established by introducing a pair of 8-week-old gnotobiotic rabbits mono-contaminated with Bacterium subtilis, and later cross-fostering hysterectomy-derived baby rabbits to these animals.
Towards the end of 1967, an SPF cat colony was also established (Bleby & Lacey, 1969) by hysterectomy and hand rearing.
At the time of the breakdown in April 1969, the total animal population of the building was approximately 2 000 mice, 500 rats, 170 guinea-pigs, 40 rabbits and 85 cats.
Entry of inanimate material, gravid uteri and staff
All gravid uteri were introduced into the building through a dunk tank. Pelleted food and hay were sterilized by gamma irradiation (2.5 Mrad) and received after irradiation packed in double polythene bags inside cardboard boxes. Just before transfer via the dunk tank into the building, the bags were taken from the boxes and the outer polythene sack removed.
The fluid in the dunk tank was a 1 % solution of hypochlorite ('Lacine Pink'; Dolphin Detergents, Shoreham-on-Sea, Sussex) and 4 % of a quaternary ammonium compound (A-3; Airwick Ltd, 11 Stoke Poges Lane, Slough, Buckinghamshire).
Tins of cat food, bottles of sterilised ('Ionglife') milk, food for staff consumption, and other small items, prepacked in sterile bottles, were immersed in the dunk tank for 30 minutes before introduction into the building. Hysterectomies were carried out in a small room outside the barrier, near the dunk tank and ultra-violet lock. Gravid uteri were placed in a warm cetrimide solution in a clean plastic box and passed into the building via the dunk tank.
Cages, cage tops, water bottles and other animal equipment suitable for sterilisation by steam were originally passed into the building via a downwarddisplacement low-vacuum autoclave.
A few months prior to the breakdown, this apparatus was replaced by a more modern high-vacuum autoclave. Items such as paper, plastic material and instruments were sterilised and introduced via an ethylene oxide chamber.
Staff-normally about 15 technicians and cleaners-entered by stepping over a rodent barrier into separate changing rooms for males and females. Each changing room was divided into 'clean' and 'dirty' areas with a shower between them.
Shoes were left on the floor, and outdoor clothing was placed in lock-ers, in the 'dirty' area. A complete change of clothing was worn. This clothing was laundered within the building, and only sterilised by means of the autoclave when initially introduced into the building. Both drinking and washing water was from a storage tank directly supplied from the mains and situated outside the barrier.
No attempt was made to sterilize the water because of the expense involved and the apparent absence of specified pathogens in the mains supply to the building.
Exit of materials and animals
A double-ended ultra-violet light chamber was used for passing clean objects and small boxes of animals out of the building.
Relevant disciplines
There were various regulations aimed at minimising the risk of contamination, at ensuring an adequate standard of animal technology, and at securing correct operation of equipment.
The entry of staff was obviously a major potential hazard.
Technicians were not allowed to work in the building if they had handled or worked with conventional animals during the previous 7 days, or had been in a conventional animal house within the last 48 hours, or if swabs from their noses and throats revealed any of the specified pathogens. Such swabs were also routinely taken at monthly intervals, after absence from work due to illness, or at any sign of upper respiratory infection such as a sore throat or heavy cold. If staff reported for duty with such mild illness, they were not allowed to work in the building until swabs had been examined by the laboratory.
Staff were also required to wear hats, gloves and face masks in all animal rooms.
Coffee, tea, biscuits and cigarettes were allowed in the common room within the building, but staff were allowed to pass in and out (via the showers), for lunch. These same rules applied to maintenance workers, scientific staff and visitors-in fact to anyone entering the building.
Microbiological screening and sterility checks
Each autoclaving or ethylene-oxide operation was checked· by a combination of appropriate tests, including indicator tape, Brown's tubes and spore strips. However, because of practical considerations, material was transferred to the clean side of the barrier before the results of the sterility checks were known, although the material was not opened or moved from this storage area before clearance was given by the bacteriology laboratory.
On a few occasions, when the tests indicated a failure of the sterilizing process, batches of material had to be removed from the building or re-sterilised and were, therefore, a technical hazard.
The dunk-tank fluid was changed regularly, but initially its effectiveness was only periodically checked by microbiological methods.
Samples consisting of 4 mice or 2 rats or 2 guinea-pigs were normally taken from a different room every 2 weeks and subjected to extensive bacteriological tests (Hill, 1966) . Rabbits and cats were sampled less frequently, as initially the colonies were too small to allow regular culling.
However, faeces from rabbits and cats were examined every 2 weeks. Cats were examined serologically for evidence of viral diseases and toxoplasmosis.
The examination of throat and nasal swabs from staff is described above. Apart from these routine periodic tests, any animal which had died or been culled for reasons of apparent disease was submitted to the pathology laboratory on the same day that they were noticed, and subjected to a diagnostic autopsy.
The procedures employed for these diagnostic examinations varied according to the lesions detected.
If a room was temporarily isolated from the main building for access from outside, it was not reopened to the main building until it had been fumigated with formalin, and a large number of swabs taken from the room appeared to be sterile.
CONTAMINATION OF THE BUILDING AND PRIOR DISEASE STATUS
Initial confirmation of contamination
Infection of mice and rats within the building by Pasteurella pneumotropica was confirmed on 21 April 1969, after 5! years of operation.
Unfortunately, the first indication of widespread infection came from an overseas establishment which had received a consignment of mice that had been despatched on 25 March 1969. Routine testing of animals from the building had been suspended since 17 December 1968 because of increasing pressure on the pathology laboratory to examine accredited breeders' colonies. However, during the period 17 December 1968 to 21 April 1969, general diagnostic autopsies had continued, and during this period no lesions associated with P. pneumotropica had been noted from a total of 266 animals examined from the SPF building.
Of these, 24 animals, which included all species of animal represented within the building, had lung and/or nasopharyngeal cultures taken, and P. pneumotropica was not isolated from any case.
On receipt of an enquiry from the overseas establishment, animals from every room in the building were examined, and Pasteurella pneumotropica was isolated from the nasopharynx of about 50 % of mice, rats and guinea-pigs, but from none of the nasal swabs taken from cats.
Characterisation of the isolated organism
It grew aerobically on 5 % horse blood agar and McConkey agar, and fermented the following sugars with acid production: raffinose, galactose, xylose, maltose, glucose, trehalose and sucrose. It failed to ferment arabinose, mannitol, lactose and salicin. The organism was also urease positive and reduced nitrate, but failed to produce indole and was ornithine decarboxylase negative.
Jt also failed to be agglutinated by Pasteurella multocida antiserum. With the exception of the indole reaction, these characteristics are typical of P. pneumotropica.
Previous bacteriological and parasitic status of the colony
As the laboratory had no highly sophisticated anaerobic facilities, it was impossible to define the actual bacteriological and mycological status of the colony in relation to organisms not specified as pathogens.
Of those organisms more easily demonstrated, the following were frequently recovered from the animals, especially from the intestinal tract: Bacillus subtilis, Clostridium welchii, Escherichia coli, Klebsiella aerogenes, Klebsiella pneumoniae, lactobacilli, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, staphylococci, Streptococcus faecalis, and diptheroid organisms.
Fungi isolated included species of Penicillium, Mucor, Aspergillus and Fusarium.
Animals were also regularly screened for parasites, and at all times pathogenic protozoa, helminths and ectoparasites were absent. Some protozoa (trichomonads, amoebae, and unidentified ciliates) were present in many of the animals, but most of these were apparently completely non-pathogenic.
The majority of animals did appear to carry Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and local lesions due to coagulase-positive staphylococci of apparent human origin were occasionally seen in most species. This latter infection, which has been described elsewhere (Blackmore & Francis, 1970) , did not cause a serious problem except in the rabbits, which showed a high incidence of cutaneous infections.
Although prior to 21 April 1969 Pasteurella pneumotropica had never been isolated from animals submitted for routine microbiological checks, it had been recovered (mainly from localised abscesses) on 9 occasions during a 3-year period, from animals culled and submitted for a diagnostic autopsy. These animals consisted of a rat in June 1966, a kitten in August 1967,2 rats and a mouse in February 1968, a mouse in April 1968, a mouse in February 1969, and a rat in March 1969. In retrospect, the building should perhaps have been closed down in June 1966, but as examination of other samples of animals from the same and adjacent cages to the animals found to be infected failed to reveal other cases of infection, it was assumed that each infection was confined to an individual animal, although the source of infection was unknown.
ACTION TAKEN ON CONFIRMATION OF BREAKDOWN
On 21 April 1969, when the mouse and rat colonies were known to be infected, animals from rooms 1, 2, 3, and 7 (Fig. 1) were culled or transferred to rooms 4, 5 and 6, and barriers erected in the corridor at positions I and II. Access to this area was by an exterior door which was unsealed in room 7.
This room became a temporary entrance lobby and changing room for staff servicing the contaminated area. A barrier containing a dunk tank was then erected at position III, between the original changing rooms, and the area between barriers II and III was fumigated and then stocked with a new nucleus of germfree mice and rats (originating from the Centre's gnotobiotic colony).
All these preliminary measures were completed within 7 days, by which time infection had also been confirmed in the guinea-pig colony which was housed in the same room as the rabbits.
However, repeated nasal swabs from the cats at this time remained negative for the presence of P. pneumotropica.
Barriers were now erected at positions IV and V and animals from rooms 14, IS and 16 removed.
The apparently unaffected cat area could then be treated as a separate unit, and rooms 14, 15 and 16 could be isolated and entered from outside for cleaning and modified to become the future permanent cat colony. This was done by dividing room 15 into a changing and shower room for staff, and providing a new entry lobby containing a dunk tank.
As soon as these modifications had been completed, the area was fumigated and all the cats transferred from rooms 17, 18 and 19 into rooms 16 and 14. The area between barriers III and IV was then cleaned, redecorated and fumigated, and barrier III removed to increase the area available for the new SPF mouse and rat colony.
The area between barriers I and II was next cleaned and decorated, the external door in room 7 resealed, the area fumigated, and barrier II removed. Barrier V was converted to include an ultra-violet light chamber to facilitate the servicing of the cat unit.
Finally, the service area between barriers I and V was cleaned, redecorated and fumigated, bringing the whole building (with the exception of the cat section) back to complete SPF status, but now subdivided into 2 units.
Although a new nucleus of SPF mice and rats was re-established within a week of the breakdown, it was about 6 months before the whole building had been refumigated.
Within 4 months, some mice and rats were again being supplied as breeding nuclei, and within a year almost all inbred strains were well established (Parrot & Eveleigh, 1970) .
Separate investigational committees for staff discipline, bacteriological control, and animal husbandry were established to consider factors possibly responsible for the contamination.
The chairmen of the 3 committees were independent in that they were not at other times responsible for the respective fields of investigation.
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF CONTAMINATION
The actual way in which contamination entered the building and became so widespread was not determined, but it was presumably related to one or more of the following factors: spread of infection from undetected animal carrier(s); introd uction during hysterectomy; introduction by staff or visitors as an upper respiratory inhabitant or mechanically; introduction due to faulty sterilization procedures; airborne introduction through ineffective filters, through the showering area, or due to a defect in the fabric of the building; introduction via the water supplies; introduction by vermin gaining access to the building; lowered standard of staff discipline.
Spread of infection from animals within the building
The possibility that the final widespread infection with P. pneumotropica was a direct result of a 'flare up' of infection being carried by a few animals must be seriously considered.
As previously mentioned, a rat was seen in June 1966 with a subcutaneous abscess associated with a species of Pasteurella. Immediate examination of animals from the same cage and from cages in the vicinity yielded negative results.
Another individual case was noted in 1967, 4 in the first quarter of 1968, and 2 early in 1969.
Initially, precise identification of Pasteurella-like organisms was not carried out, diagnostic characteristics being confined to colonial appearance and odour, the demonstration of small gram-negative bacilli showing bipolar staining, the fermentation of glucose, sucrose and maltose without gas production, and the ability to grow on plain agar. Obviously, such criteria were not sufficient to differentiate between Pasteurella multocida and P. pneumotropica, or even to distinguish them from species of Yersinia, which are most likely to infect laboratory animals.
The organisms isolated from the last 2 cases of infection detected before widespread infection of the building occurred were examined in greater detail, and conformed to the characteristics of P. pneumotropica.
As P. multocida is more obviously pathogenic than P. pneumotropica, and as there were no serious clinical outbreaks of disease, it is probable that in all previously detected cases infection was due to the latter orgamsm.
If undetected carriers of this infection had perpetuated the infection within the building for 3 years, it is difficult to explain why widespread infection did not occur until 1969. Perhaps a more tenable hypothesis would be that selflimiting infections of P. pneumotropica had been introduced into the building before the spring of 1969, after which a more infectious strain became established.
On the other hand, the general stocking rate of the whole building was continually increasing, and this may have been a predisposing factor in the spread of the infection. Flynn, Simkins, Brennan & Fritz (1968) showed that P. pneumotropica could be recovered from the gravid uteri of apparently healthy mice. During investigations carried out after contamination of our building, the organism was recovered from the uteri of mice from stock which had been used for hysterectomy.
Hysterectomy tecfmiques
It has been demonstrated (Flynn et al., 1968; Casillo & Blackmore, 1972) that mice from non-barrier-maintained units often harbour P. pneumotropica in both gravid and non-gravid uteri. In view of the large numbers of hysterectomies which were carried out, the immediate cross-fostering of the young without isolation or a quarantine period before being mixed with established SPF stock, and the lack of bacteriological examination of the uteri from which the young were derived, it will be appreciated that P. pneumotropica could easily have been introduced.
Carriage of the organism by staff or visitors
Although P. pneumotropica has been isolated from the upper respiratory tract of man (Jones, 1962) , it is a relatively rare phenomenon and was never isolated from the routine throat and nasal swabs of personnel entering the building.
It is, therefore, unlikely that infection was introduced by the active carriage of the organism by staff. The passive carriage of the organism on hands, face and other parts of the body may have been more likely.
All except 1 of the 15 permanent members of staff kept some sort of pets at home; 10 kept cats, 3 rabbits, 5 dogs, 2 rats, 2 mice, 2 guinea-pigs, 1 hamsters, I a squirrel, and 1 a gerbil. The chief technician kept 15 rabbits and 20 pigeons.
Any of these pet animals could have been infected with P. pneumotropica, and the organism then mechanically transferred to the skin, hair and clothing of their owners.
Staff from the SPF building also mingled freely during lunch breaks with personnel from conventional units elsewhere on the site.
Presumably showering and changing of clothes does help to prevent the introduction of such surface organisms to the building, but hair was not washed, and frequently protruded from beneath the official headwear. The showering areas were so designed that it was possible for staff to enter the building without actually showering, and also to walk back to the contaminated area while in the middle of changing.
Although staff may seldom if ever have blatantly ignored the rules and failed to shower before entering the building, thoughtlessness could have resulted in inefficient or hazardous use of the showering area and changing area. It is also probable that the rule concerning the wearing of rubber gloves when in the animal rooms was not always strictly observed.
Apart from regular staff, visitors and maintenance workers were also subjected to the same bacteriological checks and rules concerning recent contact with conventional animals.
However, it was more difficult to ensure that such people had not had recent contact with other animals, and the number of visitors had certainly increased prior to discovery of the building's contamination.
Faulty sterilization
Every batch of material passed through either the autoclave or ethylene oxide chamber was checked by physical indicators and/or microbiological techniques, and apart from the relatively uncommon occurrence of detected inefficient sterilisation, these operations were not considered to be a major hazard.
The dunk tank constituted a much greater risk, as it was difficult to ensure that all objects were submerged for the 30 minutes prescribed in the standing orders.
Although containers for gravid uteri were immersed only for a few seconds, they had been stored in a germicidal detergent prior to the operation. The dunk tank fluid was changed each month, but chemical or microbiological checks on the efficiency of the germicide were not routinely carried out.
Airborne infection
Although the coarse filters on the air intakes were of low efficiency, it was assumed that as the SPF building is relatively distant from other conventional animal units, the chance of introducing infection via the ventilation system was relatively low.
On 2 occasions a window was broken, but as the building was under positive pressure, and the holes were immediately temporarily sealed, the challenge was probably slight. Perhaps more hazardous was the possibility that both internal and external doors to the shower unit could be opened~t the same time in certain circumstances, such as when cats for despatch as breeding nuclei were passed out of the building through the showers and changing area, rather than the ultra-violet light lock, directly to a person working outside the building.
Jt may also be relevant that a few months before the breakdown a new high-vacuum autoclave had been installed, although attempts were made to ensure that the major constructional work involved did not interfere with the maintenance of the barrier.
Water supplies
Pasteurellae are not normally found in water supplies, but as water was not sterilized, the possibility cannot be completely dismissed.
Contamin(ltion of building by vermin
Although there was no evidence to suggest the presence of wild mice within the barrier building, they could have gained access to the roof above, and to the cavity walls. Organisms, including P. pneumotropica, carried by such animals could have gained access to the building through a crack. An electrically-operated insect destroyer was sited in the lobby outside the changing rooms, and it was effective in attracting and destroying the vast majority of flying insects in this area. On rare occasions flies and spiders were found within the clean area, and silverfish (Lepismatidae) had apparently established themselves in small numbers.
These non-parasitic arthropods were probably of little risk.
Poor staff discipline
Just prior to contamination of the building there had been a period when supervision of newer and less experienced members of staff, particularly in relation to changing room discipline, was poor.
This was due to the absence of a chief animal technician, and even after the vacancy had been filled there appeared to be a lack of awareness of the importance of these disciplines.
The committees investigating the breakdown gained the impression that there had been a degree of complacency, especially after Sf years without a breakdown, and that all levels of staff had become less conscious of the continual hazard of microbial contamination and the need to check continually the efficiency of the barrier.
GENERAL DIscussrON
It is impossible, therefore, to decide which factor or combination of factors was responsible for the initial contamination, or for the final widespread infections by Pasteurella pneumotropica.
It is suspected that the spread of infection from one or more undetected animal carriers, and the continuous hysterectomy derivation of animals without quarantine facilities, must be 2 of the more important.
Investigations were carried out in an attempt to elucidate the cause of infection, and they revealed circumstances which dictated a change of regu-lations and procedures when the SPF building was re-stocked.
They also had a considerable influence on the design of a new barrier building which was being planned.
If the SPF building had consisted of several self-contained isolated units it might have been possible to cull out and refumigate the portion containing the initially infected rat in 1966 without completely destroying the colonies within the building, and so wasting 5t years of work building up the inbred strains of animals.
It is intended that the Centre's new SPF building will consist of 6 independent units under the same roof so that, theoretically, an individual unit could become contaminated without putting at risk the remaining 5. However, the one great advantage of the design of the existing building (a converted stable) was the way in which temporary barriers could be comparatively easily constructed.
It is a feature which might well be considered by those designing SPF buildings.
It is now obvious that potentially contaminated uteri should not have been introduced to the clean side of the barrier without some form of isolation and investigation.
Uteri are now transferred to plastic film isolators, and the hysterectomy-derived young cross-fostered to germfree or SPF foster mothers. The placentae are immediately examined microbiologically, and at weaning a sample of animals within the isolator is sacrificed and submitted for laboratory examination before the young are transferred to the barrier building.
After the breakdown was detected, a nucleus of new S'PF colonies was establish~d within a week from germfree mice and rats available elsewhere in the Centre. However, to re-establish all the inbred strains a very large hysterectomy programme had to be carried out. In future it is hoped to maintain small nuclei of all strains of animals in plastic-film isolators in a germfree or gnotobiotic state, as an insurance against another contamination.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to find staff who are prepared not to keep pets at home, and it could be argued that good animal technicians are particularly likely to do so. However, staff should not be allowed to keep large colonies of animals, especially rodents, and since the breakdown all new staff have been required to sign an undertaking that they agree not to keep pets at home, if requested.
However good the theoretical concepts on which a barrier building is designed, it will fail if all levels of staff are not actively concerned with ensuring its success. It is therefore important to select staff who are sufficiently interested and intelligent to work in a building governed by principles of microbiology, and who are also psychologically suited to the slightly claustrophobic atmosphere of working behind a barrier.
Although thought was given to these principles in the building described, many animal technicians are rather young, and naturally the turnover is comparatively large, resulting in the continual training of new staff with its associated possibility of rules being inadvertently broken.
A barrier building should also be designed so that it is difficult for staff to forget or ignore rules. The initial design of our main showering and changing area can be criticised on this account, particularly with regard to the lack of precise definition between the clean and dirty areas, and the possibility of having entry and exit doors open at the same time.
The dunk-tank fluid had not been regularly checked for germicidal properties, and although it was most unlikely that it had dropped below expected efficiency, the mixture used was not ideal. The fluid now consists of 2.0 % hypochlorite alone, and available chlorine is checked weekly by chemical titration methods. It is believed that such chemical tests are more accurate and logical than the more variable microbiological 'in use' tests, although these are still used periodically as a double check.
While more efficient air filters would be an improvement they would be of much higher resistance, and the existing plant is incapable of dealing with the increased load. This will be borne in mind for the new building.
Windows were broken twice by staff playing football in the vicinity of the building (contrary to existing rules). All external windows now have protective wire grills, a surprising omission when the building was first built. The opportunity has been taken to instal adequate fire exits.
Although water supplies were not thought to be responsible for the contamination by P. pneumotropica, a fOlm of water filtration or sterilisationincluding acidification-would be an advantage in any barrier-maintained building.
Such procedures should take place between the storage tank and the outlets within the building.
This would certainly be necessary if organisms such as Pseudomonas spp. were to be excluded.
Invasion of the building by vermin did not appear to be a problem, but although precautions, such as rodent barriers, insectocutors, etc. are commonly taken, the area surrounding such a building should not contain material likely to attract such creatures.
It is, therefore, important to make certain that outside stores of non-sterilised food are rodent proof, and that refuse and waste from the building is immediately removed from the vicinity.
Although it has been suggested that incorrect sterilization of diets rarely occurs, the food store outside the barrier was certainly at one time infested with wild rodents.
It was impossible to find out how many staff had ignored rules or had not carried out procedures properly, but it was obvious that at all levels there was a degree of complacency associated with the previous success of the building.
Such dangerous complacency is difficult to prevent and must be the active concern of all senior staff, who must be continually aware of the microbiological implications of barrier maintenance of laboratory animals.
Staff with special knowledge of microbiology must be involved in any change of policy. In retrospect, the widespread contamination of the building might have been at least delayed if certain techniques and procedures discussed in this contribution had been modified sooner. Time will tell whether the adoption of additional safeguards, such as the quarantining of hysterectomised stock, are effective. It is apparent that other factors played a part, including the basic design of the building, which is far from ideal. It is easy to be critical of the building, but when the colony was first established in 1963 the whole SPF concept was unusual and techniques were still being developed. For the converted building to have been operated relatively successfully for 5t years is a tribute to the past and present members of the Centre's staff. But unfortunately it is precisely these circumstances that led to complacency.
It is hoped that the information given will help others involved in similar systems of animal husbandry, who should give serious thought to practical rules and disciplines which can be accepted and enforced by the staff. Furthermore, they should appreciate that it is arguably impossible for a barrier building to maintain a given status indefinitely, and that a programme of cleaning out and restocking at intervals would seem inevitable.
